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W est Michigan auto parts manufacturing has entered whatappears to be a period of long suffering: plant closures,layoffs, and once profitable businesses moving south in
search of lower operating costs. New grim announcements occur
with apparent regularity on the evening news. There are, however,
a number of companies in the region that continue to be successful,
that are growing and capturing new business at a profit.
In this article, I will attempt to provide insight as to how the auto
industry arrived at its current state. Then, drawing on the expe-
rience of those who have managed to survive thus far, I will
make some suggestions as to strategies local parts manufacturers
may want to employ to best insure survival, if not unconditional
success. I will cover
• the loss of demand volume from parts suppliers’ traditional 
customer base,
• the influx of the New American Manufacturers (aka 
“Transplants”), primarily into the southern states, 
• the intensity of the price, cost, and profit pressures being felt
by auto suppliers resulting from industry consolidation and 
intensified competition, 
• the resulting rapid improvement in productivity, and
• the diminished “cluster advantage” of the West 
Michigan region.
Market share losses mean lower component demand 
Failure by the traditional domestic automakers as far back as the
late 1950s to understand and satisfy U.S. auto buyer needs opened
a wide door to competing carmakers from both Europe and Asia.
The traditional Big Three first came under pressure from
Volkswagen imports during the late 1950s. The dual oil shocks of
the 1970s enabled Japanese makers, including Toyota, Honda,
Nissan (Datsun), Mitsubishi, and a number of smaller players to
gain a foothold as the Big Three found themselves totally unpre-
pared for the gasoline shortages. The story is well known and will
not be repeated here.
What may not be as generally well known is how a series of mar-
keting miscues triggered another steep decline in Big Three market
share in 1998, a decline still underway as of late 2004. General
Motors, Ford, and the then Chrysler corporation were successful in
holding a U.S. market share that cycled around 70 percent during
the early- to mid-1990s through 1997.
Beginning in 1998, the Big Three’s light vehicle share began to
plummet from 70 percent to its current level of 56.6 percent, year-
to-date through November 2004. To put this in perspective, a
thirteen percentage point decline in U.S. market share is equivalent
to eliminating the need for over nine vehicle assembly plants oper-
ating at a typical 225,000 units per year rate.
Shrinking demand for the traditional customer group has been dev-
astating to suppliers who have, for the most part, limited their sales
to that market. A supplier selling a single component used on every
Big Three vehicle sold in the U.S., for example, shipped 10.7 mil-
lion units in 1997. As of 2004, the same supplier has seen an 11.2
percent reduction in sales to not quite 9.5 million units. Obviously,
standing still with respect to maintaining the same customer base
with the same content level per vehicle is not a growth strategy. Yet
many auto parts suppliers, particularly small- to medium-sized
firms, found it difficult to diversify away from Big Three customers
during the ’90s for a variety of reasons.
There are several reasons for the market share decline, but the
onslaught of attractive new product brought to market by Asian
and European makers has had the greatest effect. In spite of huge
sales incentives that began immediately following the 9-11 attack,
the traditional Big Three have been unable to stop the losses in
market share. Their incentive spending has been averaging near
$4,000 per vehicle sold, while Japanese brand incentives average
less than a third that and the Europeans about half.
The battle to stem the decline in sales by the Big Three further
exacerbated margin stress on suppliers as the automakers pushed
hard for “cost give-backs.” The importance of price varies from one
automaker to another. Commodity vs. differentiated pricing is
clearly evident in how a General Motors goes to market compared
to BMW or Honda.
The Southern Shift
Assembly capacity in the U.S. has been shifting southward since
Nissan opened its Smyrna, Tennessee plant in 1983 and Toyota
built its Georgetown, Kentucky plant in 1988. Auto plants have
long been spread throughout the U.S. with facilities as far apart as
Massachusetts, Louisiana, Texas, southern California, and Minnesota.
Foreign car companies entering the U.S., however, have seemed to be
especially attracted to regions outside the Great Lakes states.
Volkswagen, the first “transplant,” chose Westmoreland County,
Pennsylvania for its U.S. assembly location, based largely on an
unprecedented economic incentive package offered by state and
local government authorities. A pattern was established where local
boosters bid intensely for each subsequent auto plant.
Foreign manufacturers have, for the most part, avoided states with
high manufacturing wage rates and a strong union presence in
favor of states with an available labor pool of trainable workers to
whom a $15-$19 per hour wage rate and good benefits would have
previously been an unachievable dream. The New American
Manufacturers have also benefited by hiring a younger workforce
that significantly reduces their healthcare liability.
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In 2001, 39.5% of U.S. light vehicle production capacity was
located in the Great Lakes states (including MI, OH, IN, IL, WI,
and the Windsor area in Ontario, Canada). Another 18.6 percent
was located in the southern region of the U.S. including Texas. By
2009, however, the Great Lakes states will house only 33.7 percent
of U.S. capacity, while the southern states will have 27.8 percent.
This creates a dilemma for auto parts suppliers located in the Great
Lakes area as they lose competitive advantage on two counts: one,
the lower direct labor costs of the South and, two, the lack of just-
in-time (JIT) capability (not to mention increased shipping costs)
when selling to southern customers. 
To be sure, not all auto components require JIT. Scale economies
would make the manufacture of some parts difficult to produce in
small plants adjacent to or near vehicle assembly plants at which
they are required. Engines and transmissions, for example, require
a large fixed cost investment and are usually shipped to several
plants and installed on more than one vehicle model.
Gentex, the Zeeland, Michigan automatic-dimming mirror manu-
facturer, has thus far been able to supply its worldwide customers
from its home-based three plants. The company does maintain an
extensive sales and engineering network in all of the major automo-
tive producing regions but has been able to ship its high
value-added product from a globally central location.
Cost downs
It is not unusual for a supplier’s Big Three customer to demand a
25 percent price reduction over a three-year period backed by a
threat to “move the business overseas.” The loss of pricing power
by suppliers directly results from a similar loss by their customers.
Unable to lower their own fixed costs in line with pricing require-
ments, the Big Three have applied draconian pressure to their
suppliers.
To illustrate the extent of the problem, a typical price for a pair of
sun visors for a “commodity” level vehicle sold to domestic
automakers was about $22 a pair in the early 1990s. By the mid-
90s, the market price had fallen to about $15 a pair, and today it is
well below $10. Attempting to maintain production at West
Michigan, direct labor costs is a losing proposition, as Johnson
Controls found out, finally being forced to close its Holland area
plant in 2004. 
For an average auto parts supplier, direct wages comprise only 15
percent of total costs. On average, then, in order to reduce total
costs by 1 percent, a supplier would have to reduce wages by
6.67%, given no change in productivity. Reductions to that extent
are difficult, if not impossible to attain, all else held equal.
Relocation to lower-wage-cost countries like Mexico and China
become an easy choice.
Industry consolidation both at the automaker level and what is
referred to as the “Tier Ones” (large system suppliers) has con-
tributed to the pricing pressure. Today, only nine automakers
produce over 77 percent of the light vehicles made in the world
(nearly 60 million annually). The market environment is one with a
limited number of buyers that hold inordinate control over their
suppliers. An economist calls a market with few buyers an oligop-
sony. Each customer is likely to represent a large portion of a
supplier’s sales, and there are few alternatives should a supplier
choose to go elsewhere.
While direct labor cost is an issue, flexibility is more of an issue. In
order to offset relatively high wage rates with productivity improve-
ments, parts suppliers must be unconstrained from rigid contracts
governing the flexible use of labor. West Michigan auto parts man-
ufacturing has historically enjoyed a competitive advantage over its
Detroit-Flint area counterparts, thanks to a lower incidence of
union militancy. 
One of the main reasons (there were others) that Grand Rapids lost
the Bosch plant along with 1,200 jobs was the inflexible stance of
the United Auto Workers union. There are several examples where
union representation has not impeded increased flexibility and pro-
ductivity improvements. American Axle & Manufacturing in Three
Rivers is a good example. 
Productivity improvements are driving job losses
U.S. employment at automakers and their suppliers has declined
from a high of 1.34 million in June 2000 to 1.11 million in
October 2004. Anecdotal evidence would suggest that the majority
of the more than 200,000 jobs lost was caused by productivity
improvements verses shipping jobs outside the United States.
Successful and profitable suppliers continue to restructure their
operations to do more with less, cutting labor costs while increas-
ing unit output. The recently announced reductions at Johnson
Controls in Holland are a good example.
Total workforce reductions also are occurring as the result of the
shift in vehicle manufacturing from the traditional Big Three to the
New American Manufacturers, as the latter are more likely to buy
components from the U.S. operations of their home country sup-
pliers. The “transplant suppliers” are likely to operate with a much
leaner workforce at a higher level of productivity.
As the transplant suppliers have entered North America with high
quality product and a lower cost base, the Big Three also have
increasingly bought more of their components from them. A recent
highly publicized example is the awarding of the “rolling chassis”
contract for the new Toledo Jeep plant to Hyundai Mobis verses the
Chrysler Division’s prior supplier, Dana. Although specific employ-
ment data are not available, it is expected that the Hyundai
operation, while it will employ U.S. workers, will support fewer
than Dana would have if it had landed the contract.
Up against the “Detroit Cluster”
Innovation in manufacturing technology has largely dimin-
ished what Michael Porter calls a “cluster competitive
advantage” for West Michigan. Increased capital investment in
physical plant and equipment, standardization of processes,
and increased worker productivity have reduced the demand
for “craftsman-type labor” in component manufacturing. Sub-
segment businesses of the auto parts industry where unique
labor skills are required are either single company businesses in
West Michigan, leather tanning, for example, (negating any cluster
advantage), or are in an industry segment under severe excess
capacity and profit pressure, as with tool and die making.
A strong cluster has developed in the area within a 50-mile radius
of Detroit, the center of design, engineering, and purchasing for
many of North America’s automakers. In this telecommunications
age, it may seem strange that geographic proximity still matters.
After all, it is only a little over a two-hour drive to most Detroit-area
locations if a face-to-face meeting is required. Industry participants
do, however, see a significant advantage to centering a critical mass
of human resource talent within the Detroit area. The need to “co-
locate” within quick physical access to customers has become even
more important than selection of a nearby manufacturing site. West
Michigan, unfortunately, is also losing ground in this regard.
Strategy recommendations
Anyone working in the auto industry will freely tell you how tough
it is to succeed in the automotive supply business. Given the hyper-
competition of global business, however, you could say that about
nearly every industry. In order to survive and succeed, there are
well defined strategies that West Michigan suppliers must employ.
First, while it may seem radical and “cold-hearted,” the focus
should be on employing highly skilled and educated knowledge
workers. It is a myth that America’s economic strength is centered
in manufacturing. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, man-
ufacturing employment has declined steadily as a percent of
non-farm employment, dropping from 31 percent in 1949 to only
about 11 percent today. Microsoft, with its market cap of nearly
$300 billion, ranks consistently among the top three most valuable
companies in the world. General Motors, with a market cap of only
about $21 billion, has consistently ranked as one of the largest
destroyers of economic wealth, as it invested tens of billions of dol-
lars over the last three decades and earned returns less than its cost
of capital.
Loss of manufacturing jobs is a social issue that the auto indus-
try cannot directly address. In order to remain in business, auto
parts suppliers must at least earn their cost of capital. New
investment must be carefully scrutinized to be certain that it
will be creating value.
Second, and this is obvious, provide every incentive for innovation
in the area of product offerings. Gentex may be the most striking
example of success in this regard, but should the reader take the
opportunity to tour other local companies, they will most certainly
be pleasantly surprised at the new product ideas working their way
to market. Most suppliers have been understandably obsessed with
process innovation aimed at lowering costs. Experience has shown
that innovation to offer differentiated products stands a better
chance to build competitive advantage in an industry with such
intense rivalry among participants. And, while it is certainly self-
serving to say so, West Michigan has outstanding educational
institutions that can contribute to the fostering of innovation.
Third, parts suppliers need to redouble efforts to add customers
that are less price sensitive. Yes, they are all price sensitive, but
some are more likely to allow a profit margin to suppliers of
parts with characteristics that can be differentiated at the consumer
level. It is no secret that Tower Automotive’s financial difficulties
are to some degree the result of its dependence upon Ford as its
largest customer.
Fourth, while it may be considered noble to keep manufacturing
jobs in West Michigan, regional suppliers in many cases must con-
sider locating incremental operations elsewhere in order to meet
customer requirement or to take advantage of substantially lower
factor costs. As emphasized in the first point, value creation is most
likely to come from the functional areas of program or project man-
agement, design and engineering, which can be retained in the
region. The manufacturing age has passed. We need to work to
keep the right kind of jobs in West Michigan.
By following an agenda of disciplined strategies, West Michigan
auto parts suppliers stand an excellent chance of profiting in the
coming years. It’s a tough business, but show me one that isn’t.
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i Please note that “light vehicles” referenced throughout this article, which include passenger cars and light trucks as opposed to
medium- and heavy-trucks. The category light trucks includes pickups, sport utility vehicles (SUVs), and various sizes of vans.
ii American Motors (AMC) was a viable, yet much smaller player until it was sold to Chrysler in 1987.
iii The author generally refers to firms with less than $75 million in annual sales as small. Medium-sized parts firms range 
upwards to about $750 million in annual sales.
iv The plant closed in the 1980s due to a decline in VW sales in North America.
v The Great Lakes region is not alone in suffering from a geographic shift of production. Western Europe has lost a considerable
portion of its automotive manufacturing to Eastern & Central Europe since 1990. 
vi Bauer, Julia, “For Johnson Control [sic] workers, it’s ‘Black Monday’,” The Grand Rapids Press, November 3, 2004.
vii Although the companies’ competitive position is enhanced by holding a large portion of North American capacity in a very
capital intensive industry sub-segment.
viii Porter, Michael E., The Competitive Advantage of Nations, The Free Press, 1990.
